Over the last twenty years we have seen an increasing use of in-work tax subsidies to encourage labor supply among low-income groups. In Sweden, a non-targeted earned income tax credit was introduced in 2007, and was reinforced in 2008, 2009 and 2010. The stated motive of the reform was to boost employment; in particular to provide incentives for individuals to go from unemployment to, at least, part-time work. In this paper we try to analyze the extensive margin labor supply effects of the Swedish earned income tax credit reform up to 2008. For identification we exploit the fact that the size of the tax credit, as well as the resulting average tax rate, is a function of the municipality of residence and income if working. However, throughout the analysis we find placebo effects that are similar in size to the estimated reform effects. In addition, the results are sensitive with respect to how we define employment, which is especially true when we analyze different subgroups such as men and women, married and singles. Our conclusion is that the identifying variation is too small and potentially endogenous and that it is therefore not possible to use this variation to perform a quasi-experimental evaluation of the Swedish EITC-reform. To identify the effect of the Swedish EITC-reform we instead exploit variation along two dimensions. First, the size of the tax credit is a function of the local tax rate. An individual who lives in a high tax municipality will ceteris paribus receive a higher tax credit compared to an individual who resides in a low tax municipality. Second, the absolute size of the tax credit -and even more importantly the tax credit as a share of the annual wage income -is a function of the wage income. , we obtain a sizable and highly statistically significant semi-elasticity of 0.24.
Introduction
One of the most marked features of contemporary tax policy is the use of in-work tax subsidies to combat 'poverty traps' and to encourage labor supply among low-income families with children. Leading examples are the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) in the U.S. and the Working Families Tax Credit (WFTC) in the U.K. There is a large supply-side-oriented literature evaluating the effects of these programs. In general, these papers indicate that EITC policies have been successful in enhancing labor supply at the extensive margin. 1 In Sweden, an earned income tax credit was introduced in 2007 and was further expanded in 2008, 2009 and 2010 . The announced motive of the reform was to boost employment; in particular to provide incentives for individuals to go from unemployment to, at least, part-time work (Prop. 2006/07:1, p. 136) . By lowering marginal tax rates on labor income for low and middle-income earners the reform had large effects on work incentives.
The purpose of this paper is to assess the employment effects up to 2008 of the Swedish EITC reform at the extensive margin in the working age population. To this end we use high-quality individual based register data that cover the entire Swedish population up to the tax year of 2008. While in-work credit policies implemented elsewhere typically have been targeted towards certain demographic groups (e.g. lone mothers), all Swedish citizens aged below 65 were exposed to the same tax credit schedule. 2 Therefore, in the Swedish case the empirical researcher lacks possibilities to compare employment growth between treated and non-treated groups in a transparent way.
To identify the effect of the Swedish EITC-reform we instead exploit variation along two dimensions. First, the size of the tax credit is a function of the local tax rate. An individual who lives in a high tax municipality will ceteris paribus receive a higher tax credit compared to an individual who resides in a low tax municipality. Second, the absolute size of the tax credit -and even more importantly the tax credit as a share of the annual wage income -is a function of the wage income. A low-income individual 1 See Blundell (2006) and Eissa and Hoynes (2005) for overviews. 2 For people older than 64 a more generous tax credit applied.
will ceteris paribus receive a larger reduction in the average tax rate, which is the relevant tax rate when analyzing the participation margin.
As the goal of the paper is to evaluate the effects of the EITC we perform the analysis on a sample of individuals who 2006 resided in a municipality whose local tax rate did not change between 2006 and 2008. Since the 'treatment' is a function of municipality of residence, potential income in the state of work and the timing of the reform we can estimate a triple-differences specification. In the main specification where we use 2006 as the pre-reform year and 2008 as the post-reform year and define employment as having a positive amount of earnings, we obtain a semi-elasticity of 0.52, which is statistically significant from 0 at a level of 1 %. This suggests that a one percent increase in the net-of-tax rate (1-average tax rate) leads to a 0.52 percentage point increase in the probability to be employed. Expressed in terms of the number of new jobs, this estimate translates into an employment increase of 3.3 percentage points.
Given that the 2006 mean employment rate was around 86 percent in our sample, this treatment effect must be thought of as large.
This baseline result should be interpreted with severe caution though. When we perform a 'placebo test', pretending that the EITC reform occurred between 2004 and 2006, we obtain a sizable and highly statistically significant semi-elasticity of 0.24.
Since the validity of the triple-differences specification hinges on the assumption that the effect of the 'placebo treatment' should be 0, this estimate is worrying. Thus, even though we control in a flexible way for trends in employment growth in the main specification we still believe that there is a substantial upward bias in the obtained coefficient estimate. In addition, both the reform and the placebo estimates are sensitive to how we define employment. In sum, as the reform estimates typically are larger than the placebo estimates it cannot be ruled out that the EITC policy had a positive impact on employment, but the degree of uncertainty is large.
We also show regression results from a subgroup analysis. A general pattern is that the placebo estimates are fairly close to (but typically smaller) than the reform estimates. However, the estimates changes in a non-systematic way when we use different definitions of employment, and we sometimes even find negative semielasticities. A major concern is therefore that there are trends present in the data that we fail to control for. To our knowledge, there is no other exogenous variation that can be used to evaluate the Swedish EITC, and we come to the conclusion that it is not possible to evaluate the Swedish tax credit using quasi-experimental methods.
The disposition of the rest of the rest of the paper is as follows: section 2 describes the Swedish tax system and, in particular, the earned income tax credit; section 3 discusses the previous literature; section 4 presents our empirical specification; section 5 presents the data and the sample used; section 6 contains a descriptive analysis of the data; and section 7 presents the results of the empirical analysis. Finally, section 8
concludes. Besides the fact that the formulas are rather complex, the calculation is complicated by the fact that the basic deduction, which is a function of both earned income and taxable transfers, is part of the tax credit formula. As a consequence, the income limits in the left columns of Table 1 cannot directly be translated into kink points in terms of earned income, but the kink points, and the tax credit, vary as a function of taxable transfers. Recent reforms in the unemployment insurance system and in the sickness insurance system have been surveyed by Forslund (2009) . In general, these reforms aimed at making the state of non-work financially more un-attractive. Taken together, these reforms have had a substantial impact on participation tax rates (Pirttilä and Selin, 2011) . 8 Another reform that was introduced on January 1, 2007 was an increase in the insurance contribution rates to the unemployment insurance funds. The reform aimed to link the contribution to the unemployment situation, and different sectors were hence hit differently by the reform. To some extent, the reform did offset the increase in disposable income caused by the tax credit for those who were members of the unemployment insurance fund. However, the size of the increase in the unemployment insurance contribution was in most cases modest in size in comparison to the tax credit.
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Previous literature
There is an enormous literature that analyzes how labor supply responds to taxation.
The literature can be divided into two strands where the first builds on structural estimation techniques within a discrete choice framework. While the main advantage of structural models is that they enable policy reform simulations and provide means to carry out welfare analysis, they typically build on statistical assumptions that can be considered as controversial. On the other hand, quasi-experimental techniques which make up the second strand of the literature do not require as strong assumptions, but cannot be used for ex-ante simulations of planned policy reforms. The common way to go about is to exploit group level variation in eligibility to a new policy and then to use the difference-in-differences (DD) estimator that recovers treatment effects for distinct subpopulations (like lone mothers).
Since the 1990's an extensive literature evaluating EITC policies along the DD-lines has emerged. Around the turn of the millennium, in-work tax credits were in place in a number of countries (Owens 2005) , including Belgium, Canada, Finland, France, Ireland, Netherlands and New Zealand. However, most of the literature centers on the EITC expansions in the US (e.g. Eissa and Liebman 1996 , Eissa and Hoynes 2004 and Meyer and Rosenbaum 2001 and similar policy reforms in the UK (e.g. Blundell et al., 2005; Blundell and Shephard, 2011) . A general lesson from this literature is that the labor supply response appears to be concentrated to the extensive margin, whereas the intensive margin tends to be quite unresponsive.
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The Swedish EITC-reform has until now only been investigated using structural estimation techniques. With special emphasis on lone mothers, Lennart Flood and coauthors (Flood et al 2004 , Aaberge and Flood 2008 have simulated the labor supply response to reforms in the tax and transfer system based on estimated discrete choice models on Swedish data sources.
With special relevance to our paper, Ericson et al (2009) . 13 Given that a minimum wage policy is binding on a certain segment of the labor market, an outwards shift of the labor supply curve caused by the tax credit will not affect the level of employment -it will only increase involuntary unemployment.
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In a search-matching framework Kolm and Tonin (2011) make the theoretical point that an earned income tax credit will reduce equilibrium unemployment, moderate wages, boost participation and search effort. Bennmarker et al (2011) depart from a related theoretical framework and takes the model to the data for the years 2004-09.
The idea is to examine the effect of tax progressivity (which has been affected by the introduction of the EITC) and the effect of the net replacement rate in the unemployment insurance. As mentioned above, the latter was reduced at the same time (2000) for a description. 13 There are no legal minimum wages in Sweden. However, collectively agreed minimum wages play a similar role. 14 See Lee and Saez (2010) for a recent analysis on the optimality of minimum wage policies in a freely competitive labor market in the presence of non-linear income taxation. An interesting analysis of the incidence effects of the U.S. EITC, which both takes the supply and demand side into account, is provided by Rothstein (2009). if the percentage wage growth has been rather stable in all quartiles 2004-09, including the years when the EITC has been in place. If the EITC had indeed moderated wages, then we would expect to see a slower growth in wages in the lowest quartile, which is not the case.
Evaluation strategy
4.1 Underlying model framework The empirical specification of this paper is motivated by a standard theoretical labor supply model, where the individual belonging to a certain skill group chooses whether or not to work in a certain occupation specific to each skill group. 15 Thus, the individual's decision is a binary one. The individual derives utility from disposable income and disutility from work. The individual chooses to work if the utility in the state of work exceeds utility in the state of non-work. As an earned income tax credit increases disposable income in the state of work it will ceteris paribus increase the probability to work. 16 In the main analysis, we make the assumption that individuals react in the same way to the same percentage increase in consumption in the state of work. One can then show that, under some further assumptions, the relevant right-hand side regressor is the natural log of the net-of-tax share (1-the average tax rate). In Appendix A we motivate the empirical model.
Identification
The aim of our analysis is to measure how the EITC-reform changed individuals' employment participation decisions. Since the tax credit is general in the sense that everyone is entitled to EITC, we cannot use a simple difference-in-differences approach with a control and a treatment group. Instead we utilize the fact that the EITC-reform affected individuals differently depending on the local (municipal) tax rate and the level of earnings in the state of work. In other words, the reform generates variation in the 15 Our model can be thought of as being similar to the extensive margin model in Saez (2002) . 16 A caveat is that cohabitating and married individuals who pool their income can be affected by an increase in their partner's net-of-tax earnings. Such an income effect is likely to go in the opposite direction: it will decrease the probability to work. In the empirical model described below we address this issue by including spousal income in the vector of control variables. average tax rate A  that is specific for: (i) an individual's earnings potential (y); and (ii) the municipality of residence (m). Our identification strategy hence strives to compare the labor supply before and after the introduction of the EITC among individuals with different earnings potential and different municipality of residence.
Let us start by considering the following regression equation for the employment decision:
In equation (1) (1) defines a linear probability model. An advantage with the linear probability model, as compared to, e.g., the probit model, is that time-invariant individual heterogeneity (individual fixed effects) can be controlled for. As our data is longitudinal, i  can be removed by taking the first difference (over i) of (1).
One complicating issue in the estimation of equation (1) is that an individual's income in the state of work is endogenous to the employment decision. Hence, the key right hand side regressor of equation (1) Equation (1) 
18 As explained below, we will work with two employment concepts. In the Mincer-type regressions we include all individual who are employed according the specific definition in use. Thus, potential income differs somewhat depending on the dependent variable in the main regression. 19 For individuals who are married and/or have common children we can correctly observe if they are living in the same household. However, individuals who are cohabiting but are not married nor have common children, are observed as single households in the data. This means that the single household indicator will also capture cohabitants that are unmarried and that do not have common children.
Since we are using two years of data in the main regression (2) will be estimated in a first differenced form:
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Equations (2) - (3) are in the spirit of a triple-difference equations (DDD). The critical assumption for this specification is that there are no unobserved trends in labor supply that are specific for income group and municipality. to the introduction of the EITC, they would still have faced substantial uncertainty regarding the election outcomes, as the margin of victory was small. 21 Hence, it is first starting from the last couple of months of 2006 that we would expect that people started to adapt their labor supply as a response to the reform. If this is the case we will underestimate the effect of the EITC.
Another issue that should be discussed is whether the results of our analysis could capture effects of other simultaneous reforms? We can conclude that there are a few other reforms that may also have affected the labor supply between 2006 and 2008. The crucial thing for our identification strategy, however, is that these reforms did not vary at the level of the municipality. Therefore, at the outset we find it plausible that our empirical strategy, which uses the variation between income groups and across municipalities, will be robust to policy changes mainly treated different income groups differently.
Data and sample selection
The evaluation is based on the IFAU data base that includes individual level data from for these exclusions is that we want all the variation in the change in the log net-of-tax share to be generated by the introduction of the EITC. Our final estimation sample 21 The vote share for the centre/right-parties forming government was 48.24 percent (resulting in 178 parliamentary seats), and the vote share for the three left/green opposition parties was 46.08 percent (resulting in 171 seats in parliament). (www.val.se).
consists of 2,573,000 individuals, or around half of the Swedish population aged 20-64.
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In Table 2 we report summary statistics for both the total population of taxpayers and the estimation sample as of 2006. It shows that the mean local tax rates are fairly similar in the total sample and the estimation sample. Notably, the share of people born outside Sweden is smaller in the estimation sample as compared to the total sample. We will use two definitions of employment. According to the first definition, an individual is defined as working if his or her earned income is positive. Wage income and business income form the bulk of earned income, but some smaller components have also been taken into account. 
Descriptive analysis
Before we move to the estimation results, it is useful to give a description of the tax changes resulting from the introduction of the EITC, and of the employment trends over the period studied.
Tax changes
We have already seen in Figure 2 that the EITC decreased the average income tax significantly, at least in lower income intervals. Since the regression specification in equation (3) controls for a number of confounding factors, the identifying variation is not equal to the net-of-tax share changes that are shown in Figure 4 . Rather, the identifying variation will stem from the differential response to the EITC-induced net-of-tax share changes, due to the difference in the tax change depending on income class (earnings potential) and municipality of residence. In other words, while Figure 4 shows that the EITC did give rise to substantial tax reductions, our identification strategy hinges on the assumption that individuals that experienced different tax cuts due to living in different municipalities and having different earnings potential responded differently on the margin. An illustration of this variation is given by Figure 5 If we instead focus on the variation induced by differences in potential income if working, we see from Figure 6 that this variation is considerably larger, especially for low income individuals, and that there is a negative correlation between predicted income and the change in net of average tax for incomes higher than approximately 40,000 SEK.
Hence, our approach relies on using a relatively small source of variation in the data, even though the EITC in itself generated reasonably large tax decreases. In order to get a picture of the nature of the variation that we use to identify the effect of EITC we report results from "first stage regressions" in Table 3 where we analyze the change in the log net-of-tax share (that in the next section will be our key independent variable).
More specifically, in column (1) we regress the change in the log net-of-tax share on the local tax rate. In column (2) potential income (expressed in SEK 100,000) is the sole independent variable. Columns (3)-(4) add individual specific control variables (measured in 2006). In column (5), finally, the change in the log net-of-tax share has been regressed on an interaction term between the local tax rate and potential income while controlling both for a full set of municipality dummies (fully collinear with the local tax rate) and the variables used for imputing potential income (fully collinear with imputed income). Figure 5 and Figure 6 , columns (1)-(4) reveal that the percentage change in net-of-tax share increases in the local tax rate and decreases with potential income. Given these correlations, we would expect the interaction term to be negative.
Consistent with
Column (5) confirms that this is indeed the case. The coefficient, -0.019, should be interpreted as the effect on the change in the log net-of-tax share of increasing the local tax rate by 100 percentage points and potential income by SEK 100,000 while holding everything else constant. Thus, this variation must be thought of as very small. Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. * denotes significance at 1 %, ** at 5 % and *** at 1%. The number of individuals is 2,572,599 and the number of municipalities is 181.
6.2

Employment trends
It is a key issue to understand the trends in employment during the period of study in the estimation sample. Table 4 has the same structure as Table 3 , but now the change in employment (earnings>0) is the dependent variable. Since the increase in the log net-oftax share depends positively on the local tax rate, if individuals responded to the tax credit and if confounding factors are absent, we expect a positive relationship between the local tax rate and employment growth 2006-08. However, when the control variables that are used to impute potential income are left out from the regression (column 1) there is a clear negative correlation between the local tax rate and employment growth. Interestingly, when we include the control variables (column 3) the coefficient takes on the expected sign though. The change of sign is probably due to the fact that the demographic structure differs between high tax and low tax municipalities. Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. * denotes significance at 1 %, ** at 5 % and *** at 1%. The number of individuals is 2,572,599 and the number of municipalities is 181
As the increase in the net-of-tax share depends negatively (for incomes exceeding approximately SEK 40,000) on potential income we expect to see a negative correlation between potential income and employment growth. In fact, this is what we observe from Table 4 . A SEK 100,000 increase in potential income implies a 0.8 percentage points decrease in employment. Nor the magnitude or the sign is affected by the inclusion of municipality dummies.
In our most preferred specification, defined by equation (3) in Section 4.2, we will control for all the dummy variables used to impute potential and municipality dummies.
What we do not control for is the effect of the interaction between potential income and local tax rate on the employment growth. It is therefore particularly interesting to look at the coefficient for this interaction term, which is reported in column (5). It does actually take on the expected sign, the point estimate, which is significant at a level of 1%, is -0.083. Hence, increasing the local tax rate by 100 percentage points and potential income by SEK 100,000 while holding everything else constant gave rise to an 8.3 percentage points decrease in employment 2006-08.
It is also interesting to examine how these trends looked like in the pre-reform period, 2004-06. 25 Importantly, we see from Table 5 that the same qualitative pattern is present also in the placebo period. In particular, the local tax rate has a negative effect when controls are omitted (column 1) and a positive effect when controls are included (column 3). Also, there is a negative relationship between potential income and employment growth. Finally, the interaction term in column (5) takes on a negative sign, even though it is not statistically distinct from 0.
The message to take away from this descriptive analysis is first of all that the variation that we use to identify the effects is relatively small. Second, already before the reform, there existed some trends in the data and that we must be very cautious in interpreting the results from any estimations unless we can make it credible that we have controlled for these trends. Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. * denotes significance at 1 %, ** at 5 % and *** at 1%. The number of individuals is 2,991,863 and the number of municipalities is 147.
In Table 4 and Table 5 we reported trends for the first binary employment variable, which takes the value of 1 if earnings are larger than 0. The same qualitative pattern holds also for our second binary employment variable, which takes the value of 1 if earnings are larger than 1 base amount. We have also examined subgroups with respect to gender and marital status. On the subgroup level there is some heterogeneity.
Results
In this section we first present some baseline results for the whole estimation sample.
Thereafter, we present a subgroup analysis where we divide the sample according to sex and marital status, as well as focusing on groups with a potential weak attachment to the labor market. Table 6 reports these results from four different model specifications. In addition to presenting the parameter estimate which can be interpreted as the semi-elasticity 26 , we also present the average treatment effect (ATE) that shows by how many percentage points employment has changed due to the reform. 27 In column (i) we show the results from the estimation of equation (1) where we do not include potential income specific trends and the municipality specific trends (i.e. the diff-in-diff-specification). In column (ii) we also allow for a municipality specific time effect, and in column (iii) we instead control for the covariates in the differenced-model, hence allowing for different time effects for the different ages, education etc. Finally, in column (iv) we combine the specifications from columns (ii) and (iii) which corresponds to the difference-in-difference-in-difference specification (DDD) of equation (2) estimated in first-differenced-form of equation (3).
Baseline results
In order to make credible that we do in fact estimate causal effects of the EITC-reform rather than some underlying trends that we are unable to control for we also perform 26 To obtain a more traditional labor supply elasticity one can divide the semi-elasticity by the mean participation rate in the relevant estimation sample. This elasticity illustrates the percentage change in participation that follows from a one percent increase in the net wage. 27 We define the average treatment effect as the difference between the actual employment growth 2006-08 and the counterfactual employment growth [2006] [2007] [2008] 
1 1 1ˆl og log log 1 1 1 Table 6 that when not controlling for trends we find a statistically significant semi-elasticity of 1.239, which implies an ATE of 7.8 percentage points. Taken literally, this would be an enormous employment effect of the introduction of the tax credit. This estimate increases when we include municipality specific time trends in column 2. However, when we control for trends in the covariates that we use to impute potential income the point estimate of the semi-elasticity drops to 0.476. Still, this highly significant estimate implies a large reform effect, a 3.0 percentage point increase in employment due to the earned income tax credit. In the most preferred specification (column 4), where we control both for potential income specific trends and municipality specific trends, we find an estimate of the semielasticity is 0.521 and of the reform effect 3.3 percentage points. All these estimates are significant at a level of 1%. 28 We have also run placebo regressions on a sample only including those individuals who 2006 lived in a municipality whose local tax rate did not change between 2006-08 and who did not changed municipality between 2004 and 2006. The elasticity results for earnings>0 were very similar to those presented in Section 7. How should we understand the rather large estimated semi-elasticities? Remember that when we regressed the employment change on potential income while controlling for municipality dummies (Table 4 , column 4) we found that a SEK 100,000 increase in potential income led to a 0.8 percentage point decrease in employment. At first sight, this does not appear to be a large effect. However, the "first stage" regressions reported in Table 3 (column 4) showed that the marginal effect of potential income on the change in the log net-of-tax rate was also small -a SEK 100,000 increase in potential income translated into a 0.06 percentage points decrease in the log net-of-tax change.
Since the change in the log net-of-tax share is a non-linear transformation of potential income there is no direct mapping between the linear trends and our final elasticity estimates. However, this illustrates that even a small correlation (spurious or not) between potential income and the employment change may generate high elasticities since the tax rate variation is small. One way to test whether the reform estimate is in fact an effect of the reform is to conduct a placebo analysis where we pretend that the tax credit was implemented already in 2005. If our identifying assumption of no other trends than those that we control for holds we would expect to find a parameter estimate of zero for this placebo reform. The second panel of Table 6 reports ˆp lacebo  from such an analysis (equation (4)). It turns out that the placebo estimates reported in column (1) and (2) exhibit the same pattern as the main estimates. The only difference is that they are smaller: when the covariates from the Mincer equation are controlled for they are roughly half the size.
In the DDD specification (column 4) the semi-elasticity is 0.244, which translates into a 'reform effect' of 1.542 percentage points. Hence, we believe that our main estimates of the reform effect are biased upwards. There seems to be some underlying trend in employment that covaries with the triple-interaction term, which we have not been able to take into account.
The bottom part of Table 6 Conceptually, this would correspond to a DDDD-specification. As can be seen from column (4), it turns out that this difference corresponds to a 1.75 percentage point increase in employment in the most preferred specification. This is still a large reform effect, but it is not so much higher than the employment effects found in earlier microsimulations of the same reform (Sacklén, 2009 , Ericson et al, 2009 ). However, we do not want to draw too strong conclusions from the difference between  and ˆp lacebo  , since it is very unsatisfactory to not understand the nature of the underlying trends.. Table 6 also reports results from estimations where the dependent variable is employment defined as having earnings exceeding one income base amount. In the 2006-08 regressions the semi-elasticity estimates are now higher when the variables used to imputed potential income are not controlled for (column 1-2). However, once controlling for these variables (column 3-4) the estimates are lower. In the most preferred DDD-specification of column 4, the estimated semi-elasticity is 0.353 and highly significant. This estimate implies an estimated treatment effect of 2.2 percentage points. In the placebo regression the same pattern as for earnings>0 prevails. It is noteworthy, however, that the semi-elasticity is actually estimated to be negative when the variables used to impute potential income are controlled for while omitting municipal dummies (column 3). In the placebo DDD-specification, along the lines of equation (4), the semi-elasticity is estimated to be 0.281 and highly significant. If one subtracts the placebo estimate from the reform estimate one obtains a modest semielasticity of 0.072 and a treatment effect of 0.445. The latter figure is below the simulated employment effects obtained in the earlier mentioned micro-simulation studies on Swedish data.
Hence, when using a higher cut-off limit for earnings (one income base amount) we obtain a lower aggregate response to the EITC as compared to the case when we only require earnings to be positive. We want to emphasize that these results should be interpreted with severe caution, especially in the light of the subgroup analysis that we will present in the next subsection. Still, there are a priori reasons to believe that the elasticity should be lower when using a higher cut-off limit for earnings. In fact, the 2008 design of the Swedish EITC implied that the individual faced a marginal tax rate of zero up to SEK 37,200 (whereas one income base amount was SEK 48,000). Thus, the 2008 system gave strong incentives to earn very low incomes. Part of this response would not be captured by our second employment definition.
To conclude, since the reform estimates are typically larger than the placebo estimates, we cannot rule out that the earned income tax credit did indeed increase employment. However, there is a large degree of uncertainty and it may also be the case that there are underlying trends that we have not managed to control for and that are captured by the estimated coefficients.
7.2
Subgroup analysis Since it is well known that men and women as well as married couples and singles typically respond differently to changes in tax rates we have also conducted the analysis above separately for four different subgroups: single women, single men, married women, and married men. The results are presented in Table 7 below. We now present results from the most preferred DDD-specification only (corresponding to column 4 in Table 6 ).
Two general patterns can be discerned. First, with one exception (married males, earnings over one income base amount) the reform estimate is always larger than the placebo estimate. In some cases (married females, earnings over one income base amount, and married males, earnings over zero) the difference is close to zero though. Second, the placebo estimate tends to follow the reform estimate fairly close. When the reform estimate is high (e.g. single men, one income base amount) the placebo estimate also tends to be high. We believe that this reflects underlying trends in the data, trends that render any interpretation of the reform estimates very difficult.
One further issue that makes us reluctant to interpret the difference between the reform estimate and the placebo estimate as an effect is that the results are extremely sensitive to which definition of employment we use. For example, focusing on singles, we find a larger semi-elasticity for men when using the first definition of employment, but a large semi-elasticity for women if we instead use the second definition. Finally, for married men, the difference between the reform-and the placebo-estimates are negative. Table 7 The effect of net of average tax on employment: Heterogeneous effects with respect to gender and marital status Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. * denotes significance at 1 %, ** at 5 % and *** at 1%. All regressions include the variables used to impute potential and a full set of municipality dummies.
We have also estimated the same models for different subsamples that we consider as being particularly interesting to look at. These are individuals with predicted potential income if working under SEK 100,000, immigrants born outside the Western world, young persons under 26 years of age and individuals with low education. These groups all have a lower employment rate in 2006 than the full sample. A quick view of the results from the subgroup analysis in Table 8 show that the estimated coefficients are all over the place. In some cases we even find negative semielasticites. Overall, the results from the subgroup analysis strengthen our view that we have not been able to control for all underlying trends in employment and that we therefore cannot draw any conclusions about the effects of the earned income tax credit on employment from this type of quasi-experimental set up. Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. * denotes significance at 1 %, ** at 5 % and *** at 1%. All regressions include the variables used to impute potential and a full set of municipality dummies
Conclusions
It is a very difficult task to evaluate the Swedish earned income tax credit policy. The reason is that all Swedes face the same tax credit schedule. Hence, the structure of the reform does not allow us to compare treated and non-treated groups in a simple way. To identify the effect of the Swedish EITC-reform we have instead tried to exploit smaller sources of variation along two dimensions. First, the size of the tax credit is a function of the local tax rate. An individual who lives in a high tax municipality will ceteris paribus receive a higher tax credit compared to an individual who resides in a low tax municipality. Second, the absolute size of the tax credit -and even more importantly the tax credit as a share of the annual wage income -is a function of the wage income an individual would receive if she would have chosen to work. A low-income individual will ceteris paribus receive a larger reduction in the average tax rate, which is the relevant tax rate when analyzing the participation margin.
We have estimated a triple-differences specification where we rely on a small source of identifying variation over municipality and predicted income if working in the net of average tax rate implied by the EITC. Summarizing our results we reach the conclusion that despite estimating a DDD model we do not seem to have succeeded in controlling for all underlying trends 2006-08. The placebo tests clearly indicate that there are trends that covary with the EITC reform. The same message is given by the descriptive analysis that shows similar correlations between employment on the one hand and local tax rates and predicted income on the other hand for the treatment period as for the placebo period. Unfortunately, since the identifying variation is small, minor trends may generate large elasticity estimates.
Our conclusion is hence that it is not possible to evaluate effects on employment of the Swedish earned income tax credit using credible quasi-experimental methods. The reason for this is that there is too little variation in treatment between different individuals and that there are underlying trends in employment that covaries with the tax credit in ways that are very hard to control for.
Appendix A
The empirical model chosen in this paper can be motivated in the following way. Let 
